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NEEB V. LASTRAPES, AND THE CONFUSING STATE OF THE 
ANCIENT DOCTRINE OF DELIVERY IN LOUISIANA 
William Gaskins* 
Is there a sale when the owner’s husband negotiates the deal, 
the price is never agreed upon, neither the buyer nor the real owner 
signs the document of sale, and the buyer moves into the house 
only to be replaced by the old owner after a month? These are the 
issues faced in the tangled 2011 Louisiana Fifth Circuit Court of 
Appeal case Neeb v. Lastrapes.1 This comment will recount that 
odd case, and then will briefly determine its place (and that of the 
Louisiana law underlying it) in relation to Roman and French civil 
law. 
I. BACKGROUND AND THE DECISION OF THE COURT 
In September of 2005, shortly after the Hurricane Katrina 
disaster, John Lastrapes contacted Anne Neeb via email about 
purchasing her house in Metairie, just outside of New Orleans. 
Mrs. Neeb responded that she planned to sell her house for 
$415,000; fifteen days later, Mr. Lastrapes sent her a $10,000 
“deposit,” which Mrs. Neeb accepted into her bank account. Then, 
Mr. Neeb (who did not share in his wife’s ownership) faxed an 
“agreement to sell real estate” to Mr. Lastrapes. The document 
proposed the price of $415,000 for the sale of the property, and 
was signed by Mr. Neeb, purportedly as a proxy for his wife; yet 
neither Mr. Lastrapes nor Mrs. Neeb ever signed the contract. 
Despite this, the Neebs removed some, but not all, of their 
possessions from the home, and vacated the home themselves. The 
Lastrapes then moved in, changed the locks, erected a fence, and 
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removed all of the yard’s existing landscape plants except the 
grass.  
After inhabiting the house for one month, Mr. Lastrapes called 
Mrs. Neeb and told her he would not be purchasing the property. 
He promptly quit the home, and the Neebs moved back in, all of 
this in such short time that the Neebs were able to host their family 
meal there on Thanksgiving Day (November 25, 2005). In the 
three years that followed before the trial began, Mrs. Neeb claimed 
a “homestead exemption” on the home and paid its property taxes, 
specifically admitting that she was the owner of the house in 
August, September, October, and November of 2005. Mrs. Neeb 
filed suit against Lastrapes in April of 2006, eventually alleging 
that the Lastrapes reneged on a valid obligation to buy the house. 
Despite the complicated nature of the matter, the Fifth Circuit 
made quick work of it on appeal. The Fifth Circuit overturned the 
trial court decision and declared that no sale occurred because the 
seller’s delivery and the buyer’s subsequent possession were too 
transitory to be valid.2 To be sure, the facts of the case are 
peculiar; but given how far the parties went in transferring the 
house, might not one argue that even the murkily-wrought delivery 
between the Neebs and the Lastrapes was more than sufficient to 
result in a valid sale?  
II. COMMENTARY 
A. The Louisiana Law, and Its Relation to French and Roman Law 
The court’s decision is based on Louisiana Civil Code art. 
1839, which states in pertinent part that, “A transfer of immovable 
property must be made by authentic act or by act under private 
signature.”3 As an exception to that rule the Civil Code states, 
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“Nevertheless, an oral transfer is valid between the parties when 
the property has been actually delivered and the transferor 
recognizes the transfer when interrogated under oath.”4 In other 
words, oral transfers of immovables are valid when 1) there is 
actual delivery and 2) the seller admits to the transfer. There is no 
definition of “delivery” for immovables in Louisiana law except 
that in Civil Code art. 2477, which only treats immovables 
transferred by writing;5 the question thus arises, how should a 
court determine whether a delivery of immovables without a 
writing has taken place? 
In Roman law, the earliest way to make a sale was by delivery 
of the thing (in French, tradition réelle). 6 From the requirement of 
actual delivery, there arose formalistic doctrines which integrated 
various degrees of fiction to take the place of delivery. In tradition 
symbolique, delivery of the entire thing was replaced with delivery 
of a smaller thing that represented or came from the bigger one. 
Another method was delivery by long hand (longa manu), which 
allowed the seller to merely show the thing to the buyer to effect a 
sale. Another method of effecting a sale, and one useful when the 
buyer had already possessed the thing, was delivery by short hand 
(brevi manu), in which the seller merely declared the buyer to be 
the owner. In such situations of pre-sale possession by the buyer, 
the parties might instead effect delivery by adding an additional 
element to the underlying contract, such as a usufruct, in order to 
make the contract valid (tradition feinte).7 Through all of these 
institutions, delivery remained the element necessary to effect a 
sale; only the degree of fiction allowed in the delivery changed. 
Later, Old French law came up with nothing new, and used the 
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Roman methods of delivery and fictitious delivery to satisfy the 
continued requirement of delivery for the validation of a sale.8 
Notwithstanding the reverence of the French for Roman law, 
the 1804 Code civil made a complete break from the past on the 
subject of consecration of a sale. Whereas the necessity of 
delivery, either real or fictitious, had always been the rule in civil 
law before, the drafters of the Code civil declared consent to be the 
new means of sale. Article 1589, in both the 1804 Code civil and 
that of today, reads: “La promesse du vente vaut vente, lorsqu’il y 
a consentement réciproque des deux parties sur la chose et sur le 
prix.”9 Furthermore, in article 1583, “[La vente] est parfaite entre 
les parties, et la propriété est acquise de droit à l’acheteur à l’égard 
du vendeur, dès qu’on est convenu de la chose et du prix, quoique 
la chose n’ait pas encore été livrée ni le prix payé.”10 In other 
words, the French Code civil has held since its conception that 
consent is what consecrates a sale. Planiol argues that the effect of 
the new rule is the same as that of the old because Roman delivery 
was often fictitious, and might as well have not occurred;11 yet the 
fundamental theory underlying sale was certainly changed in 1804. 
Even where the Code civil requires writing to prove a sale, consent 
is nonetheless the real modern method for achieving the sale, and 
writing is merely proof of the consent.12 
Louisiana law states that, “[a] party who demands performance 
of an obligation must prove the existence of the obligation;”13 
likewise the French Code civil says, “[c]elui qui réclame 
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l’exécution d’une obligation doit la prouver.”14 Doubtless this idea 
is the reason for the requirement that a sale be validated by a 
writing in authentic form. Perhaps the allowance for sale by 
delivery in Louisiana Civil Code art. 1839 serves the same 
purpose: not as a way around the requirement of proof of a 
transfer, but simply as another, more ancient method of proof. 
Whatever the reason for the delivery provision, its effect is exactly 
that: although modern civil law doctrine has otherwise abandoned 
its old method of consecrating a sale of an immovable, one 
Louisiana Civil Code article keeps alive the tradition of 
consecration by delivery.  
B. Interpreting the Louisiana Rule and Neeb in Light of Legal 
History 
In Neeb v. Lastrapes, the court declared that Mrs. Neeb did not 
meet the Louisiana Civil Code art. 1839 requirement that property 
be “actually delivered,” despite the facts that the Neebs moved out 
of their house, that they removed most of their possessions, that the 
Lastrapes moved into the house and lived there for a month, and 
that the Lastrapes changed the locks, dug up all of the plants, and 
erected a fence around the property. It seems that under ancient 
Roman and Old French law such actions would have constituted 
not just fictional but real delivery of the immovable into the hands 
of the sellers. Thus, the court’s decision that the actions do not 
satisfy the delivery provision under Louisiana Civil Code art. 1839 
departs from, not only the ancient law of delivery, but also the 
words themselves in the modern allowance for valid sale when 1) 
“the property has been actually delivered” and 2) “the transferor 
recognizes the transfer.”15 
Present-day law of sale in both France and Louisiana is based 
upon consent, rather than the ancient doctrine of sale by delivery. 
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Yet one article of the Louisiana Civil Code—article 1839—pays 
tribute to the ancient Roman and Old French delivery law. 
Unfortunately, the short explanation of the court in Neeb leaves 
readers to wonder why the lengthy and multi-faceted delivery to 
and possession by the Lastrapes was not sufficient for the property 
to have been “actually delivered” and thus to result in a valid sale. 
Perhaps a future case will explain this questionable departure from 
both the written and the historical law; but if to have our 
explanation we must wait for another case with facts as odd as 
those in Neeb, we may have to wait a long time. 
 
 
